ABSTRACT Since cloud computing has been playing an increasingly important role in real life, the privacy protection in many fields has been paid more and more attention, especially, in the field of personal health record (PHR). The traditional ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) provides the fine-grained access control policy for encrypted PHR data, but the access policy is also sent along with ciphertext explicitly. However, the access policy will reveal the users' privacy, because it contains too much sensitive information of the legitimate data users. Hence, it is important to protect users' privacy by hiding access policies. In most of the previous schemes, although the access policy is hidden, they face two practical problems: 1) these schemes do not support large attribute universe, so their practicality in PHR is greatly limited and 2) the cost of decryption is especially high since the access policy is embedded in the ciphertext.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an emerging technology in recent years, cloud computing provides a fast and efficient way to share data resources, and a mountain number of people access data through the network. For example, in the personal system health record system, a patient does not have to carry various paper versions of the test forms to make a diagnosis according to the traditional way, but he/she can store, retrieve and share the health record only by uploading his own personal health record to the PHR system. A patient has the full control to his/her own PHR document and authorizes who can access these health data, such as friends, family or healthcare providers. In order to
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achieve accurate access control of PHR, data owners urgently need a kind of encryption scheme that can realize fine-grained access control [22] , [28] , [30] , [32] .
Hidden ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption scheme provides a good way to solve the problem, where it achieves privacy protection by hiding access control policy. However, In the previous mechanisms [2] , [3] , [7] , the access control policy is often sent along with ciphertext explicitly, which makes it easy reveal the users' privacy, since some attributes in access structure carry crucial identity information of the legitimate users. In PHR, an access policy defined by a patient may contain some sensitive attributes such as cardiologist, central hospital and so on [8] , [31] . Therefore, for an unauthorized user, even if he cannot decrypt successfully, he can also infer from the access policy in cleartext form which the encryptor suffers from some disease. The first hidden ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (HCP-ABE) was introduced in [16] , where the access structure was embedded in the ciphertext and not sent directly. Subsequently, some other hidden CP-ABE schemes were also successively proposed in [17] - [19] . However, access structures in these schemes only support AND gates or AND gates on positive, negative and wildcard. These lead to two drawbacks. First, the size of public parameters increases linearly with the number of attributes, and secondly, the cost of the decryption is greatly increased. Due to the above drawbacks, some low-overhead schemes are introduced in [13] and [14] and the common method adopted by these schemes is to introduce a decryption test by adding some redundant components to a ciphertext before the decryption stage. Although the above schemes improve the efficiency of decryption, the length of ciphertext is also significantly increased and this will become a bottleneck restricting higher performance. Additionally, these schemes are extremely vulnerable to decisional Diffie-Hellman test (DDH-test) attack ( [9] , [20] , [27] - [29] ).
A. RELATED WORK
Since Attribute-Based Encryption was first proposed by Sahai and Waters [6] , it has been seen as the most promising approach for fine-grained access control in the field of cloud computing. With the continuous improvements of ABE, currently, there are mainly two basic types of ABE schemes, Key Policy ABE (KP-ABE) [24] , [26] and Ciphertext Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [7] , [10] , [13] . In KP-ABE scheme, keys are associated with access structure and ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes. The first KP-ABE scheme was proposed by Wang and He [24] . But in this scheme, the trusted authority fully determines the combination of attributes associated with the ciphertext, because the access control associated with the key are generated by the center for each legitimate decryption user. Then Sahai et al. proposed another KP-ABE scheme, in which the decryption keys of users' could express any access formulas over attributes, including non-monotone ones [25] .
The first CP-ABE scheme was introduced in [7] , where ciphertexts were associated with access structure defined by data owners and the key are associated with sets of attributes about users. Subsequently, there are a lot of CP-ABE schemes were also successively proposed in [15] , [17] , [18] , and [21] , but these schemes only support AND gates. To realize the access structure more expressive, Waters proposed an access structure based a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS), and it is also a provably secure scheme under the standard model [3] . In order to further protect users' privacy, the first the CP-ABE scheme with hidden access structure was proposed by Nishide et al. [16] . In their work, access control policy isn't sent along with ciphertext explicitly, in other words, no unauthorized user can obtain useful information about the access structure. Some other schemes with the same performance have been proposed by other researchers, which are called Anonymous Attribute-Based Encryption [22] , [29] . In these schemes, only sets of the user satisfying the access policy was embedded in the ciphertext, then the user can successfully decrypt the ciphertext. Later, authors in introduced another highly effective anonymous CP-ABE scheme, and its security proof was given under the Decisional Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (MBDH) [20] . However, their work only gives a general analysis and lacks detailed security proof. Some other works were proposed in [9] , [14] , and [27] to make further improvements on anonymous CP-ABE scheme. Unfortunately, all of them have to face high-overhead of decryption, which may make them lose their practicability.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In recent years, with the rapid development of internet and cloud computing, a mountain number of Intelligent Medical Systems have been designed. However, in the previous mechanisms based attribute encryption, access control policies are often sent along with ciphertext, which makes it easy to reveal the sensitive information of users in the system. Especially, in PHR, the specific attribute values in a access policy carry much more sensitive information, such as the patient's pulse frequency, his family history of hereditary diseases, the result of the patient's laboratory test report and so on. In order to deal with the above problems, our contributions mainly include the following three parts.
• Access structure: Each attribute in this paper contains two parts, attribute name index and its attribute value. And Each attribute has multiple candidate values. Every decrytor only knows the attribute name index of his own and his attribute value. Moreover, the values of the attributes in the access policy defined by the encryptor are hidden, and they are not sent with the ciphertext. Only the access matrix and the defined function ρ are sent to the decryptor along with the ciphertext. What's more, the proposed scheme can handle any access control policy that can be expressed as a linear secret sharing scheme.
• Fast decryption: Obviously, it is hard for a user to know whether his attribute set satisfies the access policy defined by the encryptor, if the access policy associated with a ciphertext is fully hidden. Therefore, a decryptor has to do a lot of calculations to determine whether he is legal or not. In this paper, we present an efficient construction of Hidden Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Supports Fast Decryption, where, the number of bilinear pairing evaluations is reduced to a constant in decryption phase.
• Data verifiability: In most previous schemes, there are usually two practical problems deserve to be considered. one is the size of the public parameters increases linearly with the size of the universe. And the other is the authorized user cannot determine whether the message he obtained through decryption is valid or not, because there is no verifiable link to the message. However, in the proposed scheme, the size of public parameters is constant, so the attribute universe in this scheme can be exponentially large and it also supports VOLUME 7, 2019 validation of decrypted messages, which can further improve the reliability of decryption. Furthermore, we also prove the full security of the proposed scheme in the standard model under static assumptions by using the dual system encryption method [1] .
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, some preliminary concepts are introduced, such as composite-order bilinear map, access structure and complexity assumptions. We describe the definition of our proposed algorithm and its security model in the section 3. The specific structure of the proposed scheme is presented in section 4. Section 5 is a detailed description of the full security proof. Finally, we give a brief conclusion and performance analysis about the proposed scheme.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. COMPOSITE ORDER BILINEAR GROUPS
Our scheme is based on composite order bilinear group whose order is the product of four distinct primes. Let G be an algorithm which takes a security parameter 1 λ as input and output a tuple (G, 4 are distinct primes, G and G T are cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 , and e : g) has order N in G T . We further require that multiplication in G, G T and the bilinear map e,are computable in polynomial time in λ. Let G P 1 , G P 2 , G P 3 , G P 4 denote that subgroups of G, respectively. Note also that if g 1 ∈ G P 1 , g 2 ∈ G P 2 then e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1. In fact, g p j , (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) be the generator of G P j , respectively. Hence, ∀α j ∈ Z N , then e(g
B. ACCESS STRUCTURES
Definition 1 (Access Struture [2] ). Let = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2 is monotone if
An access structure (respectively, monotone access structure )is a collection (respectively, monotone collection)A of non-empty subsets of {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n }, i.e., A ⊆ 2 \ {0}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called the authorized sets.
C. LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
Let U be the attribute universe, which has n categories of attributes, and U = (ATT 1 , ATT 2 , ATT 3 , . . . , ATT n ). Each attribute ATT x ∈ U has n x values, VU x = {ξ x,1 , ξ x,2 , ξ x,3 , . . . , ξ x,n x } is the set of all possible values for the x th attribute ATT x in U . In our construction, each attribute includes two parts: attribute name and its value. Where A is an l × n matrix over Z p , which called the share-generating matrix. ρ is a map from each row of A to an attribute name index. (i.e, ρ : {1, 2, 3, . . . , l} → {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}). A secret value s can be shared as follows.
Let s be a secret value to be shared, considering a column vector V = (s, y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ) (s ∈ Z p , {y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n } ∈ Z p ), then λ x = A x × V (A x denotes the x th row of A), where λ x is a share of s (x = 1, 2, 3, . . . , l). If P is any authorized attribute name index set, and I = {x|ρ(x) ∈ P} ⊆ {1, 2, 3, . . . , l}, then there exist constants {ω x } x∈I such that x∈I ω x A x = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), and the secret value s can be reconstruction by x∈I ω x λ x . Namely, if S is an unauthorized set, and I = {x | ρ (x) ∈ I L }, there exist {ω x } x∈I and the first component ω 1 is any non-zero element, then x∈I ω x λ x = 0. A subset I of {1, 2, 3, . . . , l} is said to be a minimum authorized attribute name index set of the access policy, if I satisfies (A, ρ) and its any subset I sub does not satisfy (A, ρ), we define the minimum authorized attribute name index sets of (A, ρ) as I min . We express our access policy by (A, ρ, T ), where, T = (t ρ (1) 
) is the attribute value set associated with the access policy (A, ρ). Suppose a user has an attribute set S = (I S , L S ), the user satisfying the access policy, if there exists
). I S denotes the user's attribute name index set and
Example: We assume that there are four categories of attributes in a PHR system as shown in the 
Then, his personal health records are encrypted by the access policy (A, ρ, T ) and uploaded them to the cloud. If a user with attribute set S = (I S , L S ) wants to decrypt the document, he first computes the values of
{1, 2, 3, . . . , l}) by his attribute name index I S and the map ρ associated with (A, ρ). Obviously, a data user is legal if and only if his attribute values are (Cityhospital, Genetics, Male) that is his attribute name index I S = (num 1 , num 2 , num 3 ). Then, the user calculates the value of ω j by the equation
M j ω j = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) and calculates the secret value s by the equation
) and the user failed to decrypt the document. We also point that a data user with attribute set S satisfying the access policy associated with one ciphertext if and only if
D. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
We now state the complexity assumptions used in this paper. The first three assumptions are the same assumptions as in [5] , but the group in our scheme whose order is a product of four primes which are different from [23] . Assumption 4 was used in [8] .
Assumption 1. Let G be the algorithm mentioned above and define the following distribution:
The advantage of A in breaking this assumption is defined as Assumption 2. Let G be the algorithm mentioned above and define the following distribution:
The advantage of A in breaking this assumption is defined as
If the algorithm G satisfies assumption 2, for any polynomial time adversary A , its advantage Adv 2 A is negligible.
Assumption 3. Let G be the algorithm mentioned above and define the following distribution:
advantage of A in breaking this assumption is defined as
If the algorithm G satisfies assumption 3, for any polynomial time adversary A , its advantage Adv 3 A is negligible. VOLUME 7, 2019 Assumption 4. Let G be the algorithm mentioned above and define the following distribution:
If the algorithm G satisfies assumption 4, for any polynomial time adversary A , its advantage Adv 4 A is negligible.
E. HIDDEN CIPHERTEXT POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
A hidden CP-ABE scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
It is a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs the public parameters PK and master key MSK .
KeyGen (PK , MSK , S) − → SK : The key generation algorithm takes the public parameters PK , the master key MSK and the user's attributes set S as input. It outputs the user's private key SK associated with S.
Encrypt (PK , M , (A, ρ, T )) − → CT : The encryption algorithm takes the public parameters PK , a plaintext message M , and an access structure (A, ρ, T ) as input, and outputs a ciphertext CT , where T is a set of attribute values in the access structure and not sent along with the ciphertext CT .
Decrypt (PK , SK , CT ) − → M : It takes the public parameters PK , a secret key SK associated with the attributes set S = (I S , L S ),and a ciphertext CT encrypted under access structure (A, ρ) as input, and outputs the message M or a special symbol ⊥ denotes that a user failed to decrypt the ciphertext CT .
III. SECURITY MODEL
In this part, we give the security model for our scheme. This selective security model is described by a security game between an adversary A and a challenger B. The game proceeds as follows.
Setup: The challenger B runs this algorithm (1 λ ) to output the public parameters PK and the master key MSK . Then, the public parameters are sent to the adversary A .
Phase 1: The adversary A submits sets of attributes S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S Q to the challenger B for secret key, where, Q is a polynomial bounded number. The challenger generates secret key SK S i corresponding to the set of attribute S i by running the algorithm (PK , MSK , S i ) − → SK S i .
Challenge: The adversary A submits two challenge messages M 0 , M 1 (|M 0 | = |M 1 |) and two access structures (A, ρ, T 0 ), (A, ρ, T 1 ) to the challenger B, with the restriction that none of them can be satisfied by any of the queried attribute sets in phase 1. In response, the challenger B flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, sets CT T b is the ciphertext of M b under the access policy (A, ρ, T b ), and sends the ciphertext CT T b to the adversary.
Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated. But, none of the sets of attributes S Q+1 , S Q+2 , . . . , S q satisfying the access policy corresponding to the challenger.
Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess bit b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b . The advantage of the adversary A in this game is defined as
2 |, where the probability is taken over the random bits used by the adversary A and the challenger B.
IV. OUR MOST EFFICIENT CONSTRUCTION
In this section, our main construction will be given where it will be provably secure under a concrete, non-interactive assumption. Moreover the scheme not only realizes expressive functionality but also gives an efficient decryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm in the proposed scheme will take a LSSS access matrix A as input and choose a set of random exponents from the distinct subgroups of G. Therefore, private keys and ciphertexts in this scheme are randomized to protect the sensitive information of the access structure. Assume that E = (E Enc , E Dec ) is a symmetric encryption scheme with a message space M .
The Setup algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs a tuple 4 , respectively. G and G T are cyclic groups with order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 p 4 . The system uniformly chooses a, α, α 1 , β ∈ R Z N , and g, g 1 ∈ G p 1 . Let H , H 1 be two public hash functions, where H maps an attribute value in VU x to an element in Z N , and H 1 is a pseudo-random function which maps elements in G and M to elements in M . e is a bilinear map: G × G − → G T . This algorithm computes Y = e(g, g 1 ) αα 1 , and sets the system public parameters and master key as
KeyGen (PK , MSK , S) − → SK : The algorithm takes the public parameters PK , the master key MSK and the user's attributes set S = (I S , L S ) as input, where I S denotes the user's attribute name index set and L S is its attribute value set. It chooses t ∈ R Z N and R, R 1 , R i ∈ R G P 3 for i ∈ I S . The secret keys SK = (K 1 , K 2 , {K i } i∈I S ) associated with the attribute set (S = I S , L S ) are calculated as
where A is an l × n matrix and ρ is a map from each row A x of access matrix A to an attribute name index. And
) is the attribute value set associated with the access policy (A, ρ). This algorithm chooses a random vector V = (s, y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), where s,y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n are chosen from Z N at random and s is the shared secret value. For x = 1 to l, it calculates λ x = A x × V , where A x is the vector corresponding to the x th row of A and computes X = E Enc (K, M ), F = H 1 (K||M ). In addition, it also chooses Q 0 , {Q x } 1≤x≤l ∈ R G P 4 uniformly at random. Finally, it calculates the rest of ciphertext components (C 0 , C 1 , {C x } 1≤x≤l ) as follows:
, the algorithm first computes the set I by the access matrix (A, ρ) and the set I S of decryption user, and then computes the constants
) and H (t ρ (x) ) are equal, then the components about attributes from the ciphertexts and keys can be eliminated. So, it can reconstruct the secret value s hidden in the ciphertext by x∈I ω x λ x . The decryption proceeds with SK = (I S , K 1 , K 2 , {K i } i∈I S ) as follows:
It is obvious that the plaintext M can only be recovered from equation M = E Dec (K, X ) if the key K of the symmetric encryption scheme is calculated. Then, the decryption algorithm calculates the value of F by H 1 (K ||M ). If the equation F = F holds, it outputs M , otherwise, outputs ⊥.
Correctness:
The correctness of the decryption is given as follows:
From the above formulas, if and only if the decryption user satisfying the access structure (A, ρ), i.e (H (L ρ (x) ) = H (t ρ (x) )), it can acquire the result E = 1 / 2 = e(g, g 1 ) α 1 αs . Then, the value K can be correctly recovered by the equation K = C 0 /E and the message M can also be successfully reconstructed.
V. SECURITY PROOF A. SEMI-FUNCTIONAL CIPHERTEXT AND SECRET KEY
Our security proof employs the approach as same as Lai's [5] , which is called dual system encryption. At first, we define two semi-functional structures: Semi-Functional Ciphertexts SFC and Semi-Functional Keys SFK . Both normal ciphertexts and semi-functional ciphertexts can be decrypted by the normal private keys, but it is infeasible for a semi-functional private key to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext. We made it clear in particular that SFC and SFK will not be used in the real system, and they only used in our proof.
1) SEMI-FUNCTIONAL CIPHERTEXT
We first set CT = (C 0 , C 1 , {C x } 1≤x≤l , F, X ) as the normal ciphertext, which are encrypted by the normal encryption algorithm. Select a generator g 2 of group G P 2 and choose random exponents f , u, λ x , b, µ x ∈ Z N , where, the value of µ x corresponding to a certain attribute. The semi-functional ciphertext CT is set to be
2) SEMI-FUNCTIONAL KEY
In our scheme, a semi-functional key will employ one of three forms. We first set SK = (K 1 , K 2 , {K i } i∈I S ) as the normal secret key, and choose random exponents
Three types of semi-functional keys are set as follows:
2 } i∈I S ) The security proofs are based on Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 by using a hybrid argument over a sequence of games. Now we define a series of games as follows:
Game 0 : It is the first game, and its ciphertexts and all the keys are normal.
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Game r : As the second game, the challenge ciphertexts are set to semi-functional and all the keys are set to normal. In addition, Game r is also denoted as Game 0,3 .
Let q denote the number of key queries between the challenger and adversary. And we define the following series of games, where k ∈ [1, q]. , where is non-negligible value. Then the algorithm B can be constructed with advantage in breaking Assumption 1. B is given a tuple (e, g, X 3 , X 4 , T ) and will simulate Game r or Game 0 with A . B uniformly chooses a, α, α 1 , β ∈ Z N , g, g 1 ∈ G p 1 and sends A the system public key PK = (e (g, g 1 ) α , g β , g α 1 , g a , g ). Meanwhile, B secretly keeps the master key MSK = {a, α, α 1 , β, g 1 }. When the adversary A requests the challenger about the private keys, and B can generate normal keys by using the key generation algorithm, since it knows the MSK . Then A sends B two challenge messages M 0 and M 1 , (|M 0 | = |M 1 |), and two challenge access structures (A, ρ, T 0 ),(A, ρ, T 1 ) with restriction that none of them can be satisfying any of the queried attribute set in phase 1. In response, B flips a random coin b ← − {0, 1}, chooses Q 0 , Q x ∈ G p 4 randomly. Furthermore, it also sets a column vector V = (1, y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), the set of attribute value T b = (t ρ (1) , t ρ (2) , . . . , t ρ (l) ), and computes X = E Enc (K, M b ),
Then it does the following calculations.
B sets the challenge ciphertext as CT = {C 0 , C 1 , C x , F, X }, and sends CT to the adversary A . If B uniformly chooses a, α, α 1 , β ∈ Z N , g, g 1 ∈ G p 1 and sends A the system public key PK = (g, g a , g α 1 , g β , e(g, g 1 ) αα 1 ). Meanwhile, B secretly keeps the master key MSK = {a, α, α 1 , β, g 1 }. We now explain how B answers the j th key query for attribute set S = (I S , L S ).
For j > k, it is normal key and B can create the key by running the normal key generation algorithm since it knows the master key.
For
then, creates a semi-functional key of Type 3 as follows:
Note that the values of
to their values modulo p 3 , because this is a properly distributed semi-functional key of Type 3.
∈ G p 3 and sets
Z , and computes
We observe that 
it is a properly distributed normal key. When A submits to B two challenge messages M 0 and M 1 , where M 0 and M 1 have the same length, and two challenge access structure (A, ρ, T 0 ),(A, ρ, T 1 ). B flips a random coin b ← {0, 1}, chooses Q 1 , {Q x } 1≤x≤l ∈ G p 4 and { y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n } ∈ Z N randomly. Moreover, it also sets a column vector V = (1, y 2 , y 3 
and does the remaining calculation.
B sets the challenge ciphertext as CT = {C 0 , C 1 , C x , F, X }, and sends CT to the adversary A . If X 1 X 2 = g s g 2 c , then 
B has properly simulated Game k−1,3 . Hence, the challenger can distinguish between these possibilities for T by using the output of A and Adv 2 G(λ) = .
Lemma 3: Suppose that the algorithm G satisfies Assumption 2. Then Game k,1 and Game k,2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof: If there exists an algorithm A such that |Game k,1 Adv A − Game k,2 Adv A | = , then the algorithm B can be constructed with advantage in breaking
and it will simulate Game k,1 or Game k,2 with A . B uniformly chooses α, a, α 1 , β ∈ Z N , g, g 1 ∈ G p 1 and sends A the public parameters PK = (g, g β , g a , g α 1 ,  e(g, g 1 ) αα 1 ). Moreover, B secretly keeps the master key MSK = {a, α, β, α 1 , g 1 }. We now explain how B answers the j th key query for attribute set S = (I S , L S ). Except for the k th semi-functional key, the first k − 1 semi-functional keys of Type 3 and the process of generating are as same as Lemma 2. So the remaining keys can be generated by running the normal algorithm and we do not repeat them here.
To answer the k th key request for S = (I S , L S ), B uniformly chooses r ∈ Z N and sets
From the above formula, it is obvious that the only change in the key is the adding the (Y 2 Y 3 ) r term, which randomizes the B randomly chooses α, α 1 , a, β ∈ Z N , g, g 1 ∈ G p 1 and sends A the system public key PK = (g, g β , g a , g α 1 , e(g, g 1 ) αα 1 ). B secretly keeps the master key MSK = {a, α, α 1 , β, g 1 }. When the adversary requests the challenger about the key. Except for the k th semi-functional key, the first k − 1 semi-functional keys of Type 3 and the process of generating are as same as Lemma 2. And the remaining keys are normal, which can be generated by running the normal algorithm and we are not repeated here. All the challenge ciphertext can also be constructed in the same way as in Lemma 2. So we now explain how B answers the k th key query for attribute set S = (I S , L S ).
In order to answer the k th key quest for S = (I S , L S ), B randomly chooses r, r 1 
and do the following calculations.
We observe that 4 , T ) and it will simulate Game q, 3 or Game F 0 with A . B uniformly chooses α, α 1 , a, β ∈ Z N , g, g 1 ∈ G p 1 and sends A the system public key PK = (g, g β , g α 1 , g a , e(g, g 1 ) αα 1 ). Meanwhile B secretly keeps the master key MSK = {a, α, α 1 , β, g 1 }. When the adversary A requests the challenger about the key, B randomly chooses t ∈ Z N , d 1 ∈ Z N to create a semi-functional key of Type 3 and set
where
, so this is a properly distributed semi-functional key of Type 3. When A submits to B two challenge messages M 0 and M 1 , where (|M 0 | = |M 1 |), and two challenge access structures (A, ρ, T 0 ), (A, ρ, T 1 ). The restriction that none of these two access structures submitted by A satisfying any of the queried attribute sets. B chooses b ← − {0, 1}, Q 0 , Q x ∈ G p 4 and { y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n } ∈ Z N randomly. B sets a column vector V = (1, y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ), and computes
The challenge ciphertexts are set as follows:
B sets the challenge ciphertext as CT = {C 0 , C 1 , C x , F, X }, and sends CT to A . Let g s Y 2 = g s g c 2 then B uniformly chooses α, α 1 , a, β ∈ Z N ,g, g 1 ∈ G p 1 and acquires the public parameters and master key by running the algorithm Setup. Then, B sends A the system public key PK = (N , H 1 , H 2 , g, g β , g α 1 , g a , e(g, g 1 ) αα 1 ) and secretly keeps the master key MSK = {a, α, α 1 , β, g 1 }.
When the adversary A requests the challenger about the key, B uniformly chooses t ∈ Z N , R, R 1 , {R i } ∈ G p 3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ |I S |, and creates a semi-functional key of Type 3 as follows:
We observe that
So it's a correctly distributed semi-functional key of Type 3. Then A submits to B two challenge messages M 0 and M 1 of the same length and two challenge access structures (A, ρ, T 0 ), (A, ρ, T 1 ). However, the restriction is that none of these two access structures submitted by A satisfying any of the queried attribute sets. B flips a random coin b ← {0, 1}, and also chooses r, r ∈ R Z N , Q 0 , { Q x } 1≤x≤l ∈ G p 4 and y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ∈ Z N randomly. In addition, it also sets a column vector V = (s, y 2 , y 3 , . . . , y n ) , the set of attribute value T b = (t ρ (1) , t ρ (2) , . . . , t ρ (l) ), and calculates X = E Enc (K, M b ), F = H 1 (K||M b ), λ x = A x V . Then, does the following calculation.
· Q x B sets the challenge ciphertext as CT = {C 0 , C 1 , C x , X , F}, and sends CT to A . If T = g r A 2 A 4 ,let D 2 = g r 2 , A 2 = g r r 2 , then
2 )
s(H (t ρ (x) )+β) If 4 , this is a correctly distributed semi-functional ciphertext with C 0 random in G T and C x random in G p 1 × G p 2 × G p 4 , so B has properly simulated the game Game F 1 . If T = g r A 2 A 4 , then B has correctly simulated the game Game F 0 . Hence, the challenger B can distinguish between these possibilities for T by using the output of A and Adv 4 G(λ) = .
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will give some comparisons of our scheme with previous related works ( [5] , [8] , [9] , [18] , [24] ) in terms of security and performance. In Table 1 , we provide comprehensive comparisons for some important features, including the size of public keys, private keys and ciphertexts, decryption overhead, group order, and the expression and status of access policy. From Table 1 , we can see that the size of keys in our scheme is the same with other works, but the ciphertext size of proposed scheme is smaller than them. In addition, only the proposed scheme and the work in [8] support large universe constructions. What's more, compared with the above work, only our scheme can realize constant pairing operation in the decryption phase, which can greatly improve the decryption efficiency. In Table 1 , p denotes the pairing operation. l and n are the size of access matrix and the category of attributes in the universes respectively. I is a set satisfying the access structure defined by an encryptor.
|G| and |G T | denote the number of bits for the representation of elements of G and G T . Note that the size of an element in group G p i , G and G T is set to 512 bits. Fig.3, 4 and Fig.5 give comparisons of the performance advantage of the proposed scheme with the above. The simulation is accomplished on a Windows machine with 3.40 GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-3240 CPU and 4 GB ROM. From the Fig.3, 4 and Fig.5 , it is obvious that the proposed scheme is better than others in Table 1 in terms of the size of public parameters, ciphertexts and decryption overhead. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a new method called linear secret sharing with multiple values, which can greatly improve the expression of access policy. Moreover, each attribute is divided into two parts, namely the attribute name and its value. Therefore, the most obvious advantage of the proposed scheme is that sensitive attribute values can be hidden. And it can protect users' privacy well in PHR. In the proposed scheme, the size of public parameters is constant and the cost of the decryption is only two pairing operations, which also make it more practical. Eventually, we prove the full security of the proposed scheme in the standard model under static assumptions by using the dual system encryption method. The proposed scheme only achieves partly hiding policy. It is an interesting problem that achieves fully hiding policy with fast encryption, which is left as a future work.
